Price-Independent Welfare Prescriptions and Population Size
Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, David Donaldson This note investigates the extension of price-independent welfare prescriptions (Roberts [1980a] ) to different populations sizes. Price independence requires that there exist a single ordering of nominal incomes that is consistent with a Bergson-Samuelson social-welfare ordering for each price vector. Such orderings can be used to justify inequality measures based on nominal incomes and are also needed for consistency of cost-benefit tests (Blackorby and Donaldson [1984a] , Roberts [1980a] ). Cost-benefit analysis must often deal with projects that change the number of people in the population. This is most obviously the case for population-control projects, but population changes are also the result of public-health and infrastructure projects.
Given welfarism, policies can be evaluated by means of the corresponding alternatives. An alternative A is described by a set of people who are alive and a corresponding vector of utilities, and we write
where N is the set of named individuals alive with |N| finite and u i is person i's utility level for all i ∈ N. To allow for the largest class of Bergson-Samuelson social-welfare orderings, we assume that utilities are numerically measurable and fully interpersonally comparable. 1 A is the set of all possible alternatives, 2 and R is an ordering (a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation) of A.Ā RÂ means that alternativeĀ is socially at least as good as alternativeÂ, and strict preference (P ) and indifference (I) are defined in the usual way. We assume that R satisfies the strong Pareto condition.
Strong Pareto: For allĀ,Â ∈ A such thatN =N = N:
(ii) ifū i ≥û i for all i ∈ N with at least one strict inequality, thenĀ PÂ.
1 See Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark [1984] , Bossert [1991 Bossert [ , 1997 , d 'Aspremont and Gevers [1977] , Roberts [1980b,c] , and Sen [1974 Sen [ , 1977 for discussions of information assumptions in fixed-population social choice. Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [1996] examine information invariance in a variable-population framework. 2 A may or may not contain the null alternative in which is no one is alive. Whether or not this alternative is included has no consequences on our results.
R (R + , R ++ ) is the set of (non-negative, positive) real numbers, and Z ++ is the set of positive integers. Person i's direct utility function is U i : R m + −→ R and his or her indirect utility function is V i : R m ++ × R + −→ R, where m ∈ Z ++ and m ≥ 2. That is,
where x i ∈ R m + is person i's consumption vector, p ∈ R m ++ is a price vector (faced by all individuals who are alive) 3 and y i is person i's income, wealth, or lifetime consumption. We assume that each U i is such that a solution to the maximization problem in (2) exists for all p ∈ R m ++ and all y i ∈ R + . Furthermore, U i is assumed to be monotonic which guarantees that V i is increasing in y i .
Following standard practice in the population-ethics literature, we introduce the utility level that represents neutrality, and call it u ν . 4 If utility is above neutrality, life is worth living, and if it is below, life is not worth living-a rational, fully informed, self-interested person would prefer not to have his or her experiences. We assume that neutrality requires a positive level of income for every price vector 5 and that such a level of income exists. That is, for each i ∈ Z ++ and each p ∈ R m ++ , there exists s i ∈ R ++ with
Consequently,
because U i is monotonic and, therefore, V i is increasing in y i .
Income-alternatives correspond to utility alternatives and we write
A y is the set of all possible income-alternatives. Price-independent welfarism requires that there exist an ordering R y of A y such that
for allĀ y ,Â y ∈ A y and all p ∈ R m ++ . Because R satisfies strong Pareto, price independence implies that R y must satisfy the analogous condition applied to incomes.
3 See Slivinsky [1983] for a discussion of fixed-population price independence in situations where different individuals may face different prices.
4 See Broome [1993] . Neutrality is usually normalized to zero. For an introduction to population ethics, see Donaldson [1995, 1997a,b] , Blackorby and Donaldson [1984b] , Bossert [1990] , Broome [1992] , Hammond [1988] , Heyd [1992] , Hurka [1982 Hurka [ , 1983 , McMahan [1981] , Narveson [1967] , Parfit [1976 Parfit [ , 1982 Parfit [ , 1984 , and Sen [1991] . 5 The alternative to our assumption would imply the implausible claim that any positive level of consumption, no matter how small, would make life worth living.
Lemma 1 shows that the ordering R y satisfies extended homotheticity: common scaling of the incomes in any two income-alternatives preserves their ranking. This is a straightforward generalization of Roberts' [1980a] corresponding fixed-population result, stated in his Proposition 3.
Lemma 1: Price-independent welfarism implies that R y satisfies extended homotheticity. That is,
for allĀ y ,Â y ∈ A y and all λ ∈ R ++ .
Proof:
where the third line of (8) follows from homogeneity of degree zero of the V i and the second and fourth lines follow from price-independent welfarism.
Suppose that a single individual is to be added to an alternative without affecting the utilities of any of the existing people. A critical level of utility for alternative A and individual j / ∈ N is the utility level which, if experienced by j, would make the two alternatives equally good. If the critical level is u c , then
If u c exists, it must be unique because of strong Pareto, and it may depend on any or all of the identities of the existing people (N), the utility levels of the existing people ({u i i∈N ), and the identity of the added person (j). 6 If a person-j critical level of utility exists for A, then price independence implies
where V i (p, y i ) = u i for all i ∈ N, and V j (p, y c ) = u c for all p ∈ R m ++ . y c is a person-j critical level of income for the income-alternative A y . Because the reverse implication is also true, a critical level of utility exists for A and j if and only if a critical level of income exists for A y and j. Both critical levels must be unique because of strong Pareto. We write the person-j critical level of income for A y as
Lemma 1 
for all λ ∈ R ++ . This implies that if the person-j critical level of income exists for an income-alternative, it exists when incomes are scaled; in addition, the critical level is scaled by the same factor. This observation is sufficient for Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: If price-independent welfarism is satisfied and the person-j critical level of income C N j {y i } i∈N exists for A y = N, {y i i∈N and for j / ∈ N, then, for all λ ∈ R ++ , the person-j critical level exists for the alternative N, {λy i i∈N , and
If all critical levels exist, the functions {C N j } are defined for all {y i } i∈N , and are homogeneous of degree one. Theorem 1 demonstrates that, in this case, there must be critical levels of utility that are below neutrality.
Theorem 1: If price-independent welfarism holds and all critical levels exist, there exist critical levels of utility that are below neutrality.
Proof:
For any alternative A y ∈ A y , let y c = C N j {y i } i∈N be the person-j critical level, where j / ∈ N. Now consider the alternative A λ y = N, {λy i i∈N . Its critical level is λy c by Corollary 1. Consequently, for any p ∈ R m ++ , the person-j critical level of utility for the alternative A λ = N, {V i (p, λy i ) i∈N must be V j (p, λy c ). λ can be chosen so that λy c is arbitrarily close to zero, with
and the critical level is below neutrality.
An example of a price-independent welfare prescription is given by the utility functions u i = V i (p, y i ) = a(p)y i for all i ∈ Z ++ , and a principle that requires
so thatĀ
This principle is not the same as classical utilitarianism, which uses the value function of (15) only when utilities are normalized so that zero represents neutrality. In this example, all critical levels of income and utility are zero and neutrality is above zero. Consequently, all critical levels are below neutrality. Another example is provided bȳ
and by the utility functions used in the first example. This is the average-utilitarian principle andĀ
In this example, critical levels are average utility and average income. Consequently, for low enough levels of average utility, critical levels of utility are below neutrality. Although critical levels exist for all commonly used population principles, it is possible that critical levels may not exist for some or all alternatives and added individuals. Given strong Pareto, three possibilities exist. Defining
the first case has A + P A for all u j in the image of U j -the expanded population is always regarded as better. This is the strong pro-natalist position and it favours the creation of people whose lives would be below neutrality. The second case is strongly anti-natalist, with A P A + for all possible u j . The third case is slightly more complex. It allows A + P A for some values of u j and A P A + for the rest. Because of strong Pareto, all values of u j for which A + P A must be greater than all the values for which A P A + . The first is clearly unsatisfactory: it regards the ceteris paribus addition of people below neutrality as good. The second regards population expansion as bad no matter how well off the added person is.
Price-independent welfarism has implications even when critical levels do not exist. Theorem 2 indicates that price-independent welfare prescriptions must either be strongly antinatalist or must regard the addition of some person below neutrality to a utility-unaffected population as a social improvement.
Theorem 2: If price-independent welfarism holds, then either (i) there exist an alternative A ∈ A, an individual j / ∈ N, and a utility level u j such that u j is below neutrality (u j < u ν ) and
or (ii) for all A ∈ A, all j / ∈ N, and all u j ,
Proof: Clearly, (i) and (ii) are mutually exclusive. Suppose that (ii) does not hold. Then
By monotonicity and strong Pareto,
for all y j > • y j . Let y j be any income level with that property. Consequently, by priceindependent welfarism, N ∪ {j}, y 
for all λ ∈ R ++ . Using price-independent welfarism again,
for all p ∈ R m ++ and all λ ∈ R ++ . λ can be chosen to be small enough so that
and the theorem is proved.
The results of our theorems lead us to conclude that sensible price-independent welfare prescriptions are not possible when population size and composition can change across alternatives. If critical levels exist, some of them must be below neutrality and the principles must judge the ceteris paribus addition of at least some people whose lives are not worth living to be a good thing. If critical levels do not exist, either the principle must possess the same ethically unsatisfactory property or all additions to a utility-unaffected population must be regarded as bad.
